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Introduction 
‘A balance of power that favors freedom’. This phrase, indicating the alleged primary aim of post 9/11 
U.S foreign policy, is repeated five times in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (hereinafter NSS). Since then, many important officials of the Bush 
administration have also used it frequently. Among them, the new Secretary of State and former 
National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, a scholar who prior to this had impeccable realist 
credentials, and often criticized America’s missionary zeal and U.S. tendency to misuse the military as 
an instrument of nation and democracy-building (NSS, 2002; Rice 2000; Rice 2002). 
Much less dissected than other rhetorical virtuosities of the 2002 NSS, this sentence encapsulates, 
in its simplicity, the basic intellectual and political tenets of Neoconservatism. It helps us to 
understand its ideological foundations; its powerful rhetoric; its strong appeal to different sectors of 
the American electorate; but also its intrinsic, and ultimately inescapable contradictions.  
In the first part of this essay I will try to identify the genealogy of neoconservatism. I will therefore 
concentrate on its formative period: the 1970s. At the time, neoconservatism aspired to be a response 
(and a solution) to the crisis the U.S. had undergone in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A solution, 
however, whose main intellectual and political traits had been defined in opposition to the other 
political and intellectual responses to that crisis. In the second, shorter part of the essay, I will 
concentrate instead on recent events and explain why neoconservatives were able to exert a relevant 
influence on the foreign policy of George W. Bush, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 
the 11
th 2001. By concentrating primarily on its historical and ideological foundations, I will try to 
illustrate why neoconservatism, as a visionary and utopian form of ‘crisis internationalism’, was 
ideally fit to dominate post 9/11 U.S. foreign policy discourse.
1 
Against Realism, Interdependence, and the New Left 
Returning to the U.S. after a long trip abroad, which included a stopover in what was then called 
Leningrad, American realist diplomat and historian George Kennan decided to call National Security 
Adviser Henry Kissinger. It was September 1973. Kissinger, almost at the height of his fame, was 
about to be appointed Secretary of State. The Watergate drama was unfolding with unexpected 
rapidity. Détente with the Soviet Union, the keystone of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s grand strategy, was 
beginning to be excoriated domestically, by an unlikely coalition of conservative republicans and 
disaffected liberal democrats. The latter were led by senator Henry Jackson (from Washington state) 
and were soon to be labelled as ‘neoconservatives’ (Brinkley, 1994; Ehrman, 1995; Kaufman, 2000).  
One of the main problems Kissinger had to face at the time was an amendment to the 1973 Trade 
Reform Act, sponsored by Jackson and by senator Charles Vanik (a democrat from Ohio). The 
Jackson-Vanik amendment tied the granting to the Soviet Union of Most-Favored Nation Status—a 
crucial element of the set of agreements achieved by Washington and Moscow—to the lifting of 
restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews. The amendment represented an obvious interference in 
Soviet domestic affairs. Political variables (Jackson’s presidential ambitions and Nixon’s difficulties), 
traditional anti-Communism, emotional attachment to the state of Israel and genuine concern for the 
violations of human rights in the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc were the main factors behind 
Jackson’s initiative. Furthermore, the Jackson-Vanik initiative was soon complemented by the 
neoconservatives’ embracing of the cause of Soviet dissidents, which opened another front of tension 
with Kissinger (Garthoff, 1994: 453-63; Hanhimäki, 2004: 340-2; Kaufmann, 2004: 242-60). 
                                                      
1   On this second aspect I have been influenced by many analyses, the most important of which were Ikenberry, 2004; 
Leffler, 2003; Leffler, 2004; Robin, 2004. Mario Del Pero 
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In his conversation with Kissinger, Kennan thundered against this attempt to influence U.S. foreign 
policy. According to the verbatim reconstruction left by a stenographer not very well versed in Soviet 
names, Kennan stressed that ‘nothing as yet has actually happened to either Sofarov [sic] or 
Soldzamechen [sic]’; on the contrary, the dissidents were troublemakers and ‘many of the issues that 
they’ had with the Soviet government were ‘simply ones they themselves had provoked’, to the point of 
splitting ‘the whole Russian intellectual and esthetic [sic] community’. This, according to Kennan, had 
induced ‘a lot of the most important other Russian intellectuals’ to ‘turn against them’ (‘then’—added 
Kissinger caustically—‘you know what would have happened to them under Stalin’). Kennan’s bitter 
conclusion was quintessential realism: ‘I don’t think in any case that it’s right for a great government 
such as ours to try to adjust its foreign policy in order to work internal changes in another country’.
2 
Non-interference, the separation of domestic politics from foreign policy, national interest: some of 
the basic elements of a general realist creed were all contained, in nuce, in a simple phone call. This 
creed fit well, although only for a short period, in post-Vietnam U.S. foreign policy. Much appreciated 
by a majority of Americans, it was an answer to the failure in Vietnam and to the crisis—political, 
diplomatic, economic, cultural and, in some ways, also of identity—that the country was undergoing. 
However, the creed and its implicit promise to teach Americans the hard and immutable laws of 
international politics were about to be severely challenged, and ultimately defeated. The challenge to 
the alleged realist turn Kissinger had imposed on American foreign policy was led by Cold War 
liberals, like Jackson and future ambassador at the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and by the new 
Right about to launch the presidential candidacy of Ronald Reagan. 
What was imputed to Kissinger’s realism? And how did this critique contribute to the moulding of 
a new neoconservative approach to foreign policy and national security? As American Enterprise 
Institute scholars Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk recently put it, for neoconservatives ‘realism’ has 
always been ‘deeply at odds with both American political principles and American national interests’; 
it reflects ‘a dogmatic, inflexible, even reactionary ideology’ that ‘stand[s] opposed to the great liberal 
tradition of American strategic culture’. Such tradition, oddly enough, would include ‘Abraham 
Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush’ 
(Donnelly and Serchuk, 2004a; Donnelly and Serchuk, 2004b).
3  
In the 1970s, the target of the attack was obviously détente, the historical anomaly that Donnelly 
and Serchuk implicitly refer to. Collaboration with the Soviet Union was condemned from a strategic 
and moral perspective. Strategically, Jackson and others strongly denounced the Salt agreements on 
the limitation of nuclear weapons. Many of these criticisms concentrated on the various technical 
flaws of the first Salt treaty. The limits the treaty posed to the amount of U.S. offensive weapons were 
denounced as conferring on the Soviets a de facto condition of nuclear advantage. It was claimed that 
the negotiations were exploited by the Soviet Union to achieve a condition of superiority that would 
pay a high political dividend. From this perspective, as historian Dana Allin has pointed out, 
neoconservatism offered from the beginning ‘a distinct world view, in particular, a pronounced 
pessimism about the Soviet threat’ (Allin, 1995, 54).  
More important, nuclear equivalence with the Soviet Union was unacceptable because its corollary 
could be (and should be, in strict realist terms) that the two superpowers were also morally equivalent. 
It was in these years—Donnelly and Serchuck maintain—that ‘“moral equivalence” between East and 
West slipped into the mainstream of U.S. strategic thought, and so a critique advanced by left-wing 
dissenters during the Vietnam years was adopted by a right-wing administration in the White House’ 
                                                      
2    Telephone Call George Kennan/Henry Kissinger, September 14, 1973, 8.55 pm, National Archives and Records 
Administration (hereinafter NARA), Nixon Presidential Material Project (hereinafter NPMP), Henry A. Kissinger 
Telephone Conversations Transcripts (hereinafter Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22. 
3   In the pantheon of pre neoconservatives suggested by the two authors is surprisingly missing Harry Truman, to whom 
many neocons continue instead to revere. The absence of militarily, fiscally and socially conservative Dwight 
Eisenhower, and that of traditional conservative George Bush Sr. is instead emblematic.  ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’. The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neo-Conservative Persuasion 
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(Donnelly and Serchuk, 2004a). Simply negotiating with the Soviet Union meant granting the 
communist superpower a de facto recognition of legitimacy. At the same time, not supporting Soviet 
dissidents represented a moral abdication on the part of the United States: the only country to date 
capable of standing up to the Soviet ideological and civilizational challenge. Détente was, in the end, a 
form of self-defeating neo-appeasement, which placed the U.S. in grave danger, just as it did with 
Britain in the 1930s: as sympathetic biographer Robert Kaufman wrote, ‘Jackson’s admirers and the 
senator himself saw a parallel between his relentless campaign against détente during the 1970s and 
Winston Churchill’s campaign against appeasement during the 1930s’ (Kaufman, 2000, 243). 
This explains the longing of many neoconservatives for the re-launching of the dichotomies of 
Cold War discourse, and for the clarity they provided. And, along with these, for the reaffirmation of 
the faith in the moral potential of U.S. power. The first objective thus became to dismantle the idea 
there could be any form of equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union (and, indeed, 
between the United States and the rest of the world). To achieve this goal it was necessary to tackle 
what was considered the basic precondition of the Faustian deal that the U.S. was imprudently 
accepting: the belief that strategic interdependence was inescapable and perennial, and that America’s 
‘quest for absolute security’ had entered an impenetrable labyrinth (Chace and Carr, 1988).  
Interdependence became a fashionable, as well as useful concept, in the 1970s. It expressed the 
belief that a trend was set in modern and contemporary international relations towards a greater, albeit 
not linear and progressive, interconnectedness among its various parts. As such it was not a new idea. 
During the XX century, interdependence had developed in different forms and thanks to various 
transformations which involved, at one stage or another, trade and commerce, communications, mass 
tourism, cultural diplomacy, financial transactions. But it was war, and the destructive capacity it 
acquired, that gave interdependence a frightening face and made it necessary, indeed vital, to regulate 
it. Collective security, arms agreements, international institutions embodying (and projecting) the 
community of power that Woodrow Wilson and others wanted to create, all aimed at preventing a war 
which, thanks to huge technological breakthroughs, could become uncontrollable. Attempts at 
regulation and ‘juridification’ followed suit: a process that, with stops (like those witnessed after 9/11) 
and starts, has lasted till today (Knock, 1992; Ninkovich, 1998). 
Nuclear arms took strategic interdependence to yet another dimension. Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD) illustrated clearly the post-Clausewitzian (and, indeed, postmodern) nature of atomic arms. 
The genie of war has simply evaded the bottle provided by politics. During the Cold War, then, both 
powers rapidly learned to abide by the rules of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear arms radically constrained 
states’ military sovereignty. For some scholars, this proved that nuclear proliferation could be a 
positive force for the overall stability of the system. Others identified in the absolute weapon and the 
fear of Armageddon one of the crucial factors on which a supposedly post-World War II ‘long peace’ 
had been based (Gaddis, 1987).  
The two sides accumulated huge nuclear stockpiles, although the United States maintained a steady 
lead till the late 1960s/early1970s. When rough parity was finally achieved, it became obvious that 
negotiations had to be undertaken. An arms reduction, or at least the disciplining of a potentially 
uncontrollable arms race, was needed for economic reasons and—according to many, but not to all 
strategists—to reduce the risk of a war that could annihilate the planet. However, parity and MAD 
were difficult to swallow for many Americans, including the soon-to-be neoconservatives. For these, 
they amounted to a form of appeasement. Security based upon deterrence was security based 
primarily, if not exclusively upon fear; and fear could paralyse will, inhibit courage, blind judgement 
and lead to inevitable defeat. 
Furthermore, deterrence seemed to put the safety of the United States into the hands of others. Or, 
better, into the hands of the very ‘other’: the Cold War absolute and, up to a few years earlier, 
illegitimate enemy of the United Stated (Dalby, 1988; Stephanson, 1998). Again, moral and strategic 
imperatives were combined in the denunciation of those who were making America vulnerable and Mario Del Pero 
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weak, by abandoning the traditional objective of strategic primacy. For neoconservatives, ‘the United 
States had succumbed to the evasion and alibis of appeasement. This appeasement was embodied in an 
intellectual and moral error—the concept of “nuclear sufficiency”’ (Allin, 1995: 59). 
This argument was played over and over again. Against the Nixon and Ford administrations; 
against the alleged leftist bias of the American scientific community; against the liberal tendencies of 
CIA analysts. Strategic interdependence was thus presented as unacceptable: because it undermined 
U.S. credibility vis-à-vis allies and enemies; because it tied American hands and constrained (and 
sometimes zeroed) its freedom of action; because it was immoral to build peace upon the certainty of 
global destruction in case of war; because, as Paul Nitze put it in 1979, superiority still mattered, since 
‘to have an advantage at the utmost level of violence helps play at every lesser level’ (Allin, 1995: 65). 
The attack on interdependence, however, was not limited to its strategic dimension. Also coming 
under assault were those post World War II international organizations, whose goal was to regulate 
and manage interdependence, and whose promotion had been a basic tenet of American liberal 
internationalism. The UN General Assembly, in particular, was dominated at the time by anti-U.S. 
views. Many new African and Asian states formed a voting bloc whose positions now found some 
support also in the U.S., in a vociferous as well as multicoloured New Left, who became—after 
realists and liberal ‘interdependentists’—the third target of neoconservative arrows. 
Providing a coherent description of the New Left is impossible, for the simple reason that ‘New 
Left’ was often nothing more than a convenient catch-all formula, describing a multifaceted 
movement, whose common denominator—the search for ‘an agenda for a generation’—was from the 
beginning far too loose and vague. Student activists, intellectuals, artists and the many others ‘New 
Leftists’ were influenced by different, and not always complementary, sources: from C. Wright Mills’s 
critical sociology to theories of participatory democracy, from French existentialists to Frantz Fanon 
and anticolonialism (Gitlin, 1987; Isserman, 1987).  
Impossible to define, the New Left was however very clearly profiled by its liberal and 
conservative opponents. In a way, the sudden emergence of a radical critique of everything Americans 
have stand for during the Cold War catalyzed the emergence of neoconservatism. In its first, 
embryonic stages, neoconservatism was, in fact, primarily a reaction to the political, cultural, moral, 
revisionism of the mid/late 1960s.  
Such revisionism was hardly monolithic and consistent. Its sources of inspiration were multiple and 
often contradictory. However, to its enemies (and not just to them) it was based upon a premise that 
was very difficult to accept: the outright rejection of the moral certainties and the unchallengeable 
values of Cold War liberalism, and of the vision and political project that stemmed from them 
(Brinkley, 1998: 222-36; Buhle and McMillian, 2003). ‘The conservation of liberalism’, and the 
reaffirmation of its intrinsic ‘expansionist […] character’ thus defined, ab origine, neoconservatism 
and what it stood for (Lindberg, 2004).  
In particular, the cultural relativism of New Left and its defiance of the basic universalistic tenets 
of liberalism were unacceptable to many liberals. It was no coincidence that a classic primer of Cold 
War liberalism—Arthur Schlesinger’s Vital Center—was exhumed in this period. As historian John 
Ehrman has stressed, in the late 1960s Schlesinger’s Vital Center was frequently brandished against 
the New Left’s radical criticism of American foreign policy: ‘the leading neoconservatives—Irving 
Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, to name a few were veterans of 
the vital center’ (Ehrman, 1995: 34; Mariano, 1999). 
More or less concurrently there was a progressive rediscovery among disaffected liberals of the 
‘intellectual anchor of the Cold War’: the politically and intellectually ubiquitous category of 
totalitarianism (Pal Singh, 2003: 173). This concept, an analytical tool and a rhetorical device that had 
been widely employed during the early post-World War II years, had faded progressively from the 
Cold War discourse, particularly after the season of détente had begun. Totalitarianism—’the great ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’. The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neo-Conservative Persuasion 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2005/22 © 2005 Mario Del Pero  5 
mobilizing and unifying concept of the Cold War’, which ‘provide[d] a plausible and frightening 
vision of a Manichean, radically bifurcated world’—had originally offered a politically convenient 
instrument, which complemented both theoretically and rhetorically the political dichotomies of the 
early Cold War (Gleason, 1995: 1; Adler and Paterson, 1970; Del Pero, 2004). Its rediscovery, 
particularly during the 1970s, had not been limited to the U.S. and to the Anglo-Saxon world: many 
Western European leftist intellectuals adopted it. However, this second youth of ‘totalitarianism’ as 
the primary analytical tool to decrypt the script of international politics bloomed mainly in the United 
States. It culminated in a famous article published in 1979 by neocon political scientist Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, which distinguished right-wing/transformable authoritarianisms from left-wing/ 
unredeemable totalitarianisms (Kirkpatrick, 1979; Kirkpatrick, 1982).
4  
As such, totalitarianism could be also used against the intolerable moral and cultural relativism that 
qualified the New Left. A relativism that expressed itself in the strong fascination with Third World 
alternatives to the East-West divide, such as Maoism, Castroism, Portuguese variants of Nasserism or 
new, mainly African versions of anti-imperialism.  
Such third-worldism found a warm reception in the U.N. General Assembly, whose internal 
equilibria had been drastically altered by the admission of new states emerging from the ruins of the 
last European colonies. In the general assembly, an organ that the U.S. had once been able to 
dominate, Washington suddenly found itself in a condition of minority, excoriated for its alleged 
imperialist and colonial policies. These anti-American attacks were often stereotyped and ideological. 
However, geopolitical considerations had indeed led the U.S. (and the Nixon administration in 
particular) to frequently embrace putrescent European empires, thus further alienating many recently 
decolonized countries (as was the case with the Portuguese colonies: before the 1974 revolution, 
Washington had staunchly supported Lisbon, vetoing the admission to the U.N. of Guinea-Bissau, 
which had been widely supported in the general assembly). 
This anti-American and anti-Western attitude of the general assembly reached its climax with the 
famous U.N. resolution 3379, which stated that Zionism was ‘a Form of Racism and Racial 
Discrimination’. The resolution, approved in November 1975, had been sponsored by 25 states, 
including some notorious dictatorships (such as Idi Amin’s Uganda). To many future neoconservatives 
this event signalled the moral bankruptcy of the United Nations and the substantial unreformability of 
what had once been a primary tool of U.S. hegemony. The resolution, and the philosophy it expressed, 
were scathingly denounced by the U.S. ambassador at the United Nations, neoconservative guru 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan. On that occasion, Moynihan used words that had often been reserved to the 
relativism of the domestic New Left: ‘[…] the damage we now do to the idea of human rights and the 
language of human rights could well be irreversible’—Moyinhan claimed—’most of the world believe 
in newer methods of political thought, in philosophies that do not accept the individual as distinct from 
and prior to the State; in philosophies that therefore do not provide any justification for the idea of 
human rights and philosophies that have no words by which to explain their value. If we destroy the 
words that were given to us by past centuries, we will not have words to replace them, for philosophy 
today has no such words. But there are those of us who have not forsaken these older works, still so 
new to much of the world. Not forsaken them now, not here, not anywhere, not ever’ (Gerson, 1997: 
172-3). A few months later, Moynihan would call the UN vote ‘a doubly ominous event’ which 
suggested ‘a moral callousness in the West, or moral weakness’. ‘Israel’—Moynihan maintained—
’has become a metaphor for democracy in the world. If the Israeli democracy, which persists in the 
face of the uttermost peril and difficulty, can be discredited, then it can clearly be established that 
                                                      
4   Despite claims to the contrary, the distinction was not new: it had been suggested, for instance, by U.S. officials and 
diplomats supporting the immediate inclusion of Salazarist Portugal in the developing Atlantic communitas.  Mario Del Pero 
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democracy is not a political and cultural system that can survive in a perilous and difficult world. The 
dustbin of history is for us’
5 
Un-Americaness and Exceptionalist Nationalism 
This universalistic and neo-liberal attack on third-worldism and philosophical relativism was integrated 
by the denunciation of the lack of patriotism of those who embraced these ideas in the United States. 
New Left intellectuals, and the many liberal fellow travellers, were therefore targeted for their alleged 
unpatriotic betrayal of America’s historical, time-less and universal values. The New Left was first and 
foremost ‘Un-American’. It was a culturally, politically, intellectually and morally alien phenomenon. 
Under attack, Jeane Kirkpatrick claimed, was the belief that the U.S., despite all, was a ‘decent and 
successful—though imperfect—society’. Irving Kristol asserted that American ‘young radicals’ were 
‘far less dismayed at America’s failure to become what it ought to be than they [were] contemptuous of 
what it thinks it ought to be. For them as for Oscar Wilde, it [was] not the average American who [was] 
disgusting; it [was] the ideal American’ (Kirkpatrik, 1973; I. Kristol, 1970: 4).  
What was considered a vituperation of America generated a cultural and political backlash, which 
would contribute to the shaping of a distinct neoconservative identity and to the rise, in the second half of 
the 1970s, of the new Right. As one disgruntled U.S. political scientist would later recall, neoconservatism 
arose ‘in reaction to what was perceived as an American political establishment that had come to see the 
United States as the major problem in the world, both in the East-West Cold War and in the Third 
World. Neoconservatives, on the other hand, saw the United States as the major solution in the world, 
especially with a Cold War still on in both East-West and North-South terms’ (MacDonald, 2003). 
Third-Worldism and the New Left were therefore presented as extraneous to real America. To its way 
of life, its values, and its beliefs. Most of all, to its faith in the role that the U.S. should play in the world, 
and in the moral and transformative potential of its power. What’s relevant for our analysis is that the 
same kind of criticism was directed towards the other two products of (and responses to) the crisis of the 
late 1960s/early 1970s: realism (in its Kissingeresque or ‘continental’ variation) and interdependence 
(primarily in its ‘liberal-institutionalist’ academic variant). Kissingerism, interdependence and the New 
Left shared a common element in the eyes of their neoconservative critics: their un-Americaness and 
their extraneousness to American political and even philosophical traditions. 
Realism, as we have seen, was presented as a typically un-American way of conceiving 
international relations and the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The Vietnam war and the discredit it 
brought upon idealist crusades and modernization strategies had made a-moral realpolitik attractive 
and appealing to the American public. The idea that America could finally move out of perennial 
adolescence and be initiated into the harsh realities of world politics was indeed very popular in the 
early 1970s. Kissinger, the ‘American Metternich’, conveniently (and opportunistically) played the 
role of the statesman that could teach the United States how to behave in the international arena. On 
this, the German émigré turned into an Americans statesman was able to build for a short span of time 
his fame and his political fortunes, both of which reached their apogee in 1973-74. Continental 
realism, in its Kissingerian variant, thus seemed to offer a way out of the tunnel that the U.S. had 
entered (Hanhimäki
 , 2004; Hanhimäki
 , 2003; Isaacson, 1992; Gaddis, 1994; Beisner, 1990). 
However, Kissinger’s fame faded rapidly. The crusade for a new morality in U.S. foreign policy, 
launched by the neoconservatives and by Reagan’s new right, hit Kissingerism hard. The supposedly 
un-American nature of Kissinger’s approach to international affairs, indeed its initially mesmerizing 
                                                      
5   Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ‘We are Sakharov’, July 5, 1976, commencement address of Daniel Patrick Moynihan at the 
convocation of Hebrew University, Henry M. Jackson Papers, University of Washington Libraries, Manuscripts 
Collections, Seattle, WA (hereinafter, HMJP, UWLMC), Accession No. 3560-6 (Foreign Policy and Defense Issues), 
Subject Files, Box 37. ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’. The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neo-Conservative Persuasion 
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‘Europeaness’, began to be harshly rebuked. One National Review commentator went as far as to 
describe Kissinger as an ‘unassimilated outsider […] a European by heritage and cultural choice, a 
cosmopolitan by circumstance, an American by deliberate (and hazardous) calculation’ who ‘revealed 
the derivative nature of his national identity in almost pathetic fashion’ (Laqueur, 1973: 46).  
Kissinger ended up being attacked within the Ford administration. In 1975 he lost his position as 
National Security Adviser and saw détente with the Soviet Union denounced by new members of the 
administration, such as the young Ford’s chief of staff and then Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld. Ambassador at the United Nations and democratic maverick, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
systematically challenged Kissinger’s approach during his tenure at the U.N. The principal of non-
interference was rejected outright by Moynihan. Freedom, he believed, could not survive in one 
country alone. Instead of retreating into his shell, the United States should re-embrace its security 
tradition, based upon the spread of democracy and free-markets, the defense of human rights and the 
rejection of any form of a-moral power politics. In a talk called ‘Was Woodrow Wilson right?’ 
Moynihan, claimed that the United States had to accept the ‘duty to defend and, where possible, 
advance democratic principles in the world at large’ for ‘democracy in one country was not enough 
simply because it would not last […] There will be no struggle for personal liberty (or national 
independence or national survival) anywhere in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America which 
will not affect American politics. In that circumstance, I would argue that there is only one course 
likely to make the internal strains of consequent conflicts endurable, and that is for the United States 
deliberately and consistently to bring its influence to bear on behalf of those regimes which promise 
the largest degree of personal and national liberty’ (Moynihan, 1974: 26-8).  
An often idealized version of Wilsonian idealism was thus juxtaposed to the alleged realist turn of 
the early 1970s. Realism/Kissingerism was denounced as un-American because it was based upon an 
unacceptable premise: that all the actors taking part in the international drama were in the end morally 
equivalent. For such realism power did make the difference and defined, eventually, a world hierarchy. 
However, morality—much to the horror of Jackson, Moynihan, Reagan et al.—did not seem to have a 
place in international relations. Kissinger attempted to face the sudden decline of his popularity by 
lecturing the American public on this. Despite all his efforts, the mood in the country had changed. 
Reagan’s calls for a return of ‘morality in foreign policy’ proved to be much more successful.  
Reagan did not gain the nomination, but the democratic candidate Jimmy Carter would use the 
‘morality issue’ effectively in his campaign to defeat Ford and bring an end to Kissinger’s experience 
in government. Kissinger—Carter proclaimed critically a few days before the elections—had 
promoted a foreign policy ‘obsessed with power blocs’ and ‘spheres of influence’; ‘a foreign policy 
based on secrecy’ that by definition ‘has had to be closely guarded and amoral’ (Hanhimäki, 2004: 
435-6 and 450-1). 
At the same time ‘interdependentists’ were also condemned as a manifestation of an un-American 
(and very European) virus that was spreading, unchecked, through a once healthy America. For 
realism, states were independent and morally equivalent units of an anarchic and intrinsically 
competitive system. America’s traditional claims to moral superiority did not easily fit into such a 
vision. However, stressing the interdependence of the various subjects of the international system was 
equally at odds with the America intended by neoconservatives. While realism stressed independence 
as much as moral equivalence, interdependence emphasized mutual dependence and 
interconnectedness: the inexorable loss, or significant reduction, of national sovereignty. All countries 
being interconnected, and mutually dependent, they claimed that even the United States, this once 
unique and exceptional nation, found itself constrained by an objective situation and by a set of rules, 
norms and practices that it had itself crucially contributed to create. Interdependence thus seemed to 
put the fate of America also, when not primarily, into the hands of others. 
As I pointed out earlier, however, it was strategic interdependence that proved impossible to 
accept. The search for primacy and power preponderance, a traditional goal of U.S. Cold War foreign Mario Del Pero 
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policy, had been justified in strategic and psychological terms. In a ‘total symbolic war’, as the Cold 
War was, America’s unchallengeable superiority would strengthen Washington’s credibility vis-à-vis 
its friends and enemies. And credibility was an invaluable asset in the perennial post-1945 struggle for 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people (Leffler, 1992; Ninkovich, 1998). 
Through superiority, Americans were assured that, all things considered, the U.S. would preserve 
its nuclear supremacy. Despite the horrible costs of any hypothetical new war, the U.S. could again 
emerge from a world war as the final victor (Trachtenberg, 1991).  
Such promises were however increasingly meaningless. To say that explicitly, as an exasperated 
Kissinger once did, was nevertheless politically impossible. Accepting the principle of nuclear 
sufficiency had much to do with the Vietnam crisis and with the impressive rearmament undertaken by 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it proved difficult, if not impossible, to impose this change onto the 
American public; evermore so, after it became known that the first Salt agreement granted the Soviets 
a clear superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles (well balanced by America’s lead in other 
categories and by its technological advantage) (Garthoff, 1994). 
Sufficiency seemed to many to be just a one-way stop towards inferiority. This explains the loud 
request for a return to the safer and more acceptable principle of superiority. Even more, it explains 
the developing of a dream that is still very much with us: the creation of a defensive shield, capable of 
defending the republic and of making it, once more, unassailable. A shield that would allow the 
country to regain its lost sovereignty and, with it, its freedom of action; to reacquire the independence; 
to remake the U.S. an exceptional nation, exempted from those laws of history that the other nations 
had instead to abide by.
6  
We need here to mention an ideological and discursive construct—exceptionalism—that has 
accompanied the United States from its inception, and which had undergone a deep crisis in the 
turbulent 1960s and 1970s, only to be relaunched in the following years. The ideology of American 
exceptionalism, as Australian historian Ian Tyrrel brilliantly illustrated some years ago, is based upon 
the ‘pre-historicist idea of the United States as a special case ‘outside’ the normal patterns and laws of 
history’. It is an ideology that ‘runs deep in American experience’ and that conveniently overlooks the 
many interactions that have always existed between the United States and the rest of the world, Europe 
in particular. And it is an ideology that generates many paradoxes: its assertion of uniqueness and 
separation expresses, in historian Tiziano Bonazzi’s apt definition, ‘an acute need of Europe […] that 
cannot be explained only in psychological and cultural terms, but with the fact that, as much as it 
denied it, the United States belonged to Europe’. In America’s exceptionalist self-representation, 
Europe would thus become a ‘persona ficta’, an ‘alter ego’ in which the United States could (and can) 
mirror and represent itself. By doing so, America’s exceptionalism originates a ‘rhetoric of absences’, 
where the absences are however ‘the ills and defects of a universalized external world’, to the point of 
determining a situation in which ‘having posited its identity in difference, and its difference in 
exemption from the rule, the American myth lies, in its own way ‘elsewhere’’ (Tyrrel, 1991: 1031; 
Bonazzi 2003; 383; Bonazzi, 2004; Rodgers, 1998: 24).  
Neoconservatism, its vision of the world, and its idea of America’s role and mission in the 
international arena stemmed from this exceptionalist nationalism: an ideology of ‘national greatness’, 
based upon the premise that the United States will not fall, whatever might happen. Cold War 
liberalism had adhered to such belief, and had contributed to a de facto globalization of American 
nationalism (Fousek, 2000; Stephanson, 1995). But this nationalist/universalist creed had been 
radically shaken by Vietnam, internal turmoil and, obviously, détente. Those years saw the 
disintegration of the consensus on which the universalist assumptions of Cold War liberalism had until 
then rested (Suri, 2003). 
                                                      
6   Vivid nationalist and exceptionalist topoi permeated for instance most of Reagan’s speeches on its Strategic Defense 
Initiative (Fitzgerald, 2001).  ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’. The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neo-Conservative Persuasion 
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Neoconservatism was therefore the last remake of U.S. exceptionalist nationalism. It affirmed the 
intrinsic uniqueness of America. It asserted the superior quality of the American nation and the benign 
nature of the overwhelming power that the United States had come over time to possess [Lieven, 
2004]. However, exceptionalist nationalism could not, by itself, provide a sufficient political and 
cultural platform. Neoconservatism, as we have seen, offered an intellectual and political exit strategy 
from the crisis, real or perceived, that America underwent in the 1960s and early 1970s. An exit 
strategy from the abrupt disappearance of those moral and political certainties that had provided the 
pillars of U.S. Cold War policies and discourse.  
The other exit strategies we previously discussed—Kissingerism, interdependence, and New Left 
third-worldism—could be easily, but mistakenly, categorized as un-American. The U.S. was indeed 
often presented by them as either morally equivalent to other states, interlocked in the inexorable web 
of global interdependence, or imperialist and much responsible for many world’s injustices and 
inequalities. However, despite the neoconservatives’ claims, these three responses to the crisis all had 
a distinctive, some could say exceptional, American blend. Kissinger was in many ways the 
quintessential and paradigmatic product of a specifically U.S. national security establishment, whose 
various vogues he had frequently followed. He shared with neoconservatives a strong disdain for 
Western European allies and their alleged inclinations to appeasement to the point of urging a new 
‘agonizing reappraisal’ of the Atlantic relationship.
7 Most ‘interdependentists’ believed in a global 
legalism, indeed in a juridification of international relations, whose intellectual and political premises 
were very much American (Maguire, 2001). Finally, in the confused magma of the New Left one 
could easily find the shining sparks of a radical and leftist exceptionalist legacy, either it being 
communitarianism, traditional progressivism or populism. Most New Left’s exponents embraced what 
they believed were long forgotten American values and principles: their ‘élan and language’ were 
often ‘utterly American’ and ‘steeped into traditional American individualism’ (McCrisken, 2003). 
Similarly, revisionist historiography frequently offered a distinctively exceptionalist reading of 
American history (Doenecke, 2001; Ribuffo, 2001; Buhle and Rice-Maximin, 1995). 
Caricaturing them as un-American was therefore as convenient as it was disingenuous for 
neoconservatives. However, it was not enough to offer a credible and alternative exit strategy. It could 
be little more than a good starting point.  
Re-asserting the values of Cold War liberalism was not sufficient, either. Times had changed, and 
the challenge, while emanating from the same source (i.e., Communism and the Soviet Union), had 
modified its tactics. Furthermore, many Cold War liberal icons—beginning with Schlesinger—were 
moving in the opposite direction, towards what neoconservatives believed was a new and self-
defeating appeasement of the totalitarian challenge.  
More was therefore needed to construct a new identity and the political project that should follow 
it. This badly needed surplus was found by opposing the other exit-strategies. It was constructed in 
negative and oppositional, but nonetheless very powerful, terms. 
A neoconservative could be defined as a ‘liberal mugged by reality’, in a well-known definition 
attributed to Irving Kristol. Reality and realism were therefore brandished against the many political 
and philosophical utopias to which Americans had fallen prey. Utopias which had contributed to 
generate totalitarian projects or, as in the case of naive liberals, had made them blind to the perils that 
the existential threat of Communism was still posing to the United States. 
There was (or there was supposed to be) a philosophical underpinning to this anti-utopian and anti-
totalitarian new realism and it was distinctively anti-European. Anglo-American pragmatic liberalism, 
heir of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment, was in fact contrasted to what Irving Kristol called the 
                                                      
7   Telephone Call between Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, November 3, 1973, NARA, NPMP, Telcons, 
Chronological File, Box 22. Mario Del Pero 
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‘French-Continental enlightenment’ (here Kristol’s anti-utopian view was a very rough and simplified 
version of that of Jacob Talmon). According to Kristol, American liberalism had fallen ‘under the 
influence of the insidious French continental tradition’ pushing it de facto toward totalitarianism 
(Gleason, 1995: 193-194; I. Kristol, 1993).  
Mugged by a reality that many liberals had now chosen not to see, neoconservatives appeared 
nonetheless to have been also realist neophytes, persistently mugged by the powerful and unavoidable 
legacy of traditional U.S. missionary idealism. If realism was waved against naïve utopianism of any 
kind, idealism was invoked against the cynical, a-moral, value-free realpolitik then infecting U.S. 
attitudes toward world affairs. Even from this perspective, Europe was the chief villain. It was again 
no coincidence that the realism under attack was frequently adjectived and qualified as ‘continental’ 
(i.e., European) realism, much different from its Anglo-Saxon or American version. Continental 
realism was therefore presented as a self-defeating version of the realist creed; its primary trait—its 
critics maintained—was a deeply-embedded historical pessimism: in the future of the world and, most 
of all, in America’s willingness and capacity to mould it accordingly to its values, needs and desires.  
What qualified the neoconservative project was thus its belief in America’s uniqueness and its 
optimistic faith that such uniqueness could be used as a force for good in the international arena. 
Neoconservatism was unmistakably American and optimist: ‘the first variant of American 
conservatism in the past century that is in the American grain’, according to Irving Kristol. And 
therefore ‘hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic’, whose ‘general tone is cheerful, 
not grim or dyspeptic. Its 20
th century heroes’ were ‘TR, FDR, and Ronald Reagan. Such Republican 
and conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, and Barry 
Goldwater’ were ‘politely overlooked’ (I. Kristol, 2003; Romero, 2003; Ikenberry, 2004).  
Optimism and anti-Europeanism were, ab origine, the twin keystones on which neoconservatism 
was founded. This long before 9/11, Rumsfeld’s remarks on ‘Old Europe’, and the very popular 
gendered division between a virile and martial America and a feminine and passive Europe (Kagan, 
2003; Cox, 2003).  
Optimism, exceptionalism, nationalism and anti-Europeanism were however complemented by an 
almost schizophrenic attempt on the part of neoconservatives to simultaneously play and reconcile 
realist anti-utopianism and utopian anti-realism; balances of power and universal freedoms. 
Neoconservatism, as its oxymoronic name implies, offered from the beginning a syncretic and 
ultimately incoherent message. This structural inconsistency contributed towards increasing its appeal, 
but undermined the coherence of its proposal from the start. 
Out of the 1970s, into the New Millennium: Neoconservatism Tested.  
Reagan’s success had a dual effect on neoconservatives. First, it catalyzed a diaspora within the 
democratic camp that, with some notable exceptions (Moynihan among them), led most 
neoconservatives to join the Republican Party. Second, it granted to some neocons—such as Jeane 
Kirkpatrick and Henry Jackson’s aide-de-campe, Richard Perle—the possibility to play an important 
role in the new Republican administration.
8  
Reagan’s nationalist posture, his morally bombastic rhetoric and, most of all, his support to missile 
defense elicited neocons’ enthusiasm. This enthusiasm, however, cooled rapidly. Reagan’s Middle 
East policy, in particular, did not satisfy neoconservatives’ requests for a radical change in the course 
undertaken the previous decade. Reagan’s decision to sell the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, 
signalled his intention to follow Kissinger’s strategy in the region. The goal remained to preserve an 
advantageous geopolitical configuration of power, and to maximize stability (and consequent access to 
                                                      
8   Kirkpatrick was appointed ambassador at the U.N. Perle was named Assistant Secretary of Defense for international 
security policy. ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’. The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neo-Conservative Persuasion 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2005/22 © 2005 Mario Del Pero  11 
resources), to the detriment of political transformation, democratization and extension of Western and 
U.S. cultural hegemony (Ehrman, 1995: 145-48). 
Reagan’s opening to Gorbachev was seen by many (though not all) neoconservatives as détente 
redux. The leading neocon magazine, Commentary, continued to emphasize the Soviet expansionist 
design, now camouflaged behind Gorbachev’s bid to give a human face to Soviet Socialism. All in all, 
the business of governing a country, within the constraints that the Cold War still imposed, proved 
difficult to conciliate with the radicalism of the neoconservative vision.  
The presidency of George Bush senior (1989-1992) saw a further decline in the neoconservatives’ 
influence. U.S. foreign policy became even more cautious and, for many neocons, far too pro-Arab 
(Secretary of State, James Baker, in particular, was accused of being insensitive to Israel’s security 
needs). Much to neocons’ disapproval, Kissinger’s acolytes (Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence 
Eagleburger) and moderate conservatives, like Baker himself, took control of American foreign 
policy. Some neoconservatives—Joshua Muravchik among them—went as far as to endorse Bill 
Clinton in 1992 [Muravchik, 1993; Ehrman, 1995].  
The 1990s were seen and interpreted very ambiguously by neoconservatives. The end of the Cold 
War was seen as a vindication of the policies they had supported in the 1970s. The USSR—they 
claimed—had finally been trounced by Reagan’s confrontational stance and by his re-launching of the 
arms competition, not by the appeasers’ attempts to coopt and integrate Moscow into the liberal and 
interdependent world order. Similarly, the impressive boom of the U.S. economy in the 1990s, and the 
rapid waning of the much feared Japanese challenge, proved that fashionable talks of America’s 
decline, which had inundated libraries and bookshops in the previous decade, were mostly unfounded. 
Declinism, the trendy and dominant paradigm in the 1980s, had simply been proved wrong. The 
gloomy post-Vietnam pessimism was finally overcome.  
At the same time, however, the neocons’ marginalization continued unabated, in the country and in 
U.S. conservatism at large. Many commentators, and some neoconservatives themselves, proclaimed 
the final and complete amalgamation of neoconservatives within U.S. mainstream conservatism, in 
spite of their dissatisfaction with Bob Dole in 1996 and with the same George W. Bush in 2000 (many 
neoconservatives, including Weekly Standard’s editors, William Kristol and David Brooks, endorsed 
Arizona senator John McCain during the republican primaries).  
The intellectual trends of the period, even within the Republican world, contributed to this 
marginalization. The very popular ‘ends of history’, in whatever form they were presented, left little 
room for the idealistic missions and the global crusades that neoconservatives had always been fond 
of. The ‘clashes of civilizations’, on the other hand, were simultaneously a manifesto (albeit very 
ambiguous) of a cultural relativism that was completely ad odds with the neocons’ universalism and of 
a surreptitious realism, in which civilizations replaced states as the ultimately impenetrable and 
antagonistic units of the international system (Fukuyama, 1991; Huntington, 1996). 
Lastly, but most importantly, during the 1990s, the moral issue came again to the fore of 
neoconservatives’ preoccupations. Under the neocons’ critical gaze came the inherent philosophy of 
Clinton’s foreign policy and his attempt to promote globalization and enlarge the area of free markets, 
without tackling the very political problems that were obstructing the full unfolding of U.S. and 
Western hegemony. To neconservatives this appeared not just as ‘internationalism on the cheap’, but 
as a fundamentally a-political and a-moral project, reflecting a sort of economic determinism that 
greatly overestimated the imminent transformative strength of economic mechanisms. It was—
according to William Kristol and Robert Kagan—a situation ‘reminiscent of the mid-1970s’. To 
preserve and possibly expand U.S. hegemony ‘a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy 
and moral confidence was needed’. American foreign policy—Kagan and Kristol proclaimed—had to 
‘be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its 
fundamental national interests’ were ‘always in harmony’. A ‘remoralization of America at home’ 
required ‘remoralization of American foreign policy. For both follow from Americans’ belief that the Mario Del Pero 
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principles of the Declaration of Independence’ were ‘not merely the choices of a particular culture’, 
but ‘universal, enduring, ‘self-evident’ truths’. This was, after all, ‘the main point of the conservatives’ 
war against a relativistic multiculturalism. For conservatives to preach the importance of upholding the 
core elements of the Western tradition at home, but to profess indifference to the fate of American 
principles abroad’ was ‘an inconsistency that cannot help but gnaw at the heart of conservatism’ (W. 
Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 27-31). 
Similar concerns were expressed by Irving Kristol. The world—Kristol claimed in a 1997 op-ed for 
the Wall Street Journal—had ‘never seen an imperium of this kind, and it is hard to know what to 
make of it. In its favor, it lack[ed] the brute coercion that characterized European imperialism. But it 
also lack[ed] the authentic missionary spirit of that older imperialism, which aimed to establish the 
rule of law while spreading Christianity […] what it’ did ‘offer the world’ was ‘a growth economy, a 
‘consumerist’ society, popular elections and a dominant secular-hedonistic ethos […] a combination 
that’ was ‘hard to resist—and equally hard to respect in its populist vulgarity […] an imperium with a 
minimum of moral substance’ (I. Kristol, 1997). Freedom—declared on his part neoconservative 
historian Michael Ledeen—had been ‘betrayed’: the U. S. ‘led a global democratic revolution, won the 
Cold War’ but then simply ‘walked away’(Ledeen, 1996). 
The liberal empire then taking form was very different to the one that neoconservatives had long 
dreamed of. This despite the fact that some of the military interventions the neocons had invoked were 
finally undertaken during the last decade of the XX century. Either defended as ‘humanitarian wars’ or 
harshly denounced as expression of a new ‘military humanism’, these interventions were certainly 
coherent with neconservatives’ requests to exercise U.S. overwhelming power for the defense of 
human rights and the global spread of democracy. Nonetheless, some neoconservative commentator, 
such as Charles Krauthammer, denounced them from a realist perspective, presenting them as futile 
exercises, and as wasting American resources in areas (such as Kossovo) that were substantially 
irrelevant for the U.S. national interest (Krauthammer, 1999).  
Neoconservatives were given an important role in the Bush Jr. administration. This was due to the 
new President’s political ideas, which were in many ways much more radical than those of his father 
or of 1996 Republican candidate, Bob Dole. For the first time since the Reagan’s presidency, 
neoconservatives came to occupy important positions in the administration. John Bolton was 
appointed undersecretary of State for arms control; I. Lewis Libby became vice-President Cheney’s 
chief of staff; Richard Perle headed the non-governmental/very influential Defense Policy Board 
finally; Stephen Hadley was named deputy national security adviser; many other neocons were 
appointed to less important posts. But the most important prize was certainly won by Johns Hopkins 
University political scientist Paul Wolfowitz, who became Rumsfeld’s deputy at Defense (Woodward, 
2002; Drew, 2003; Mann, 2004).  
However, and despite later conspiratorial claims to the contrary, a neconservative (or ‘Straussian’) 
cabal did not take control of the United States and of its foreign policy in January 2001. From its 
inception, the Bush administration was a sort of coalition of different conservative breeds: hard-nosed 
nationalists (Cheney and Rumsfeld); self-proclaimed intellectual realists (Rice); traditional republican 
internationalists (Powell and Armitage); the religious Right (Ashcroft); and, finally, the 
neoconservatives themselves.
9 With the advent of Bush Jr., neoconservatives became again very 
influential, but were not at all hegemonic, in the administration and within American political and 
intellectual conservatism at large.  
Then came 9/11 and the overall balance of power within the administration changed drastically. 
The neoconservatives’ radical, and until then minority, vision was adopted as the Administration’s 
                                                      
9   These partitions are quite arbitary. Many of these ‘conservatisms’ do obviously overlap. However, they are useful to 
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policy. The neoconservatives’ denunciation of the ‘dis-functionality’ of the Middle East suddenly 
appeared prophetic. Their traditional condemnation of the Faustian deal accepted by the U.S. in the 
region (i.e., stability and access to resources in exchange for lack of hegemony and cultural 
impermeability) were vindicated. 
But why was this so? Why did neoconservatism seem to offer a viable political (and geo-political) 
response to the new challenge at the time? 
Many critical commentators have claimed that 9/11 triggered into action the long sleeping projects 
of the new American Right. Namely: to retune America’s dominance in the Atlantic Alliance; to 
relaunch a vast program of high-tech military investments, further consolidating and expanding the 
U.S. uncontested strategic primacy; to free intelligence agencies of the residual restraints imposed on 
them in the mid and late 1970s; to finally get rid of Saddam Hussein and start the political and cultural 
transformation of the Middle East. 
There is more than a grain of truth in all of this. Neoconservatives certainly saw the proof that they 
had been right all along in the dramatic events of September the 11
th, and that their criticism of U.S. 
foreign policy and its approach to external threats had been correct. And they seized this opportunity 
to convince Bush to adopt policies and implement actions they had long advocated.  
But there was more to it than this. Once Bush declared a war against terrorism, a new surge of 
exceptionalist patriotism followed suit, and Neoconservatism was principally, as we have seen, a 
manifestation of a powerful and alluring nationalism. Once Islamic terrorism was declared a new 
‘totalitarian’ menace, by liberals and conservatives alike, the response could only be couched in moral 
absolutes.
10 And once again, neoconservatism offered powerful moral dichotomies: it had been 
created, as an intellectual and political phenomenon, as a result of them. Finally, and most importantly, 
the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon catalysed a request for bold visions and 
radical projects. Only the neocons seemed to offer one, in the Republican world and, probably, in the 
entire country. Therefore, neoconservatism was (or appeared to be) at the time the only real ‘crisis 
internationalism’ available in the market of political ideas in the United States. In this sense, it was 
indeed Wilsonian, as many commentators would later claim (Hassner, 2002; Rhodes, 2003; 
Fukuyama, 2004). A ‘crisis internationalism’ is, in historian Frank Ninkovich’s apt definition, an 
attempt ‘to develop new rules for navigating through a turbulent and unpredictable modern 
international environment’, when relevant crises render ‘the old rules of the game and foreign policy 
traditions out of date’. Such attempt has a deeply embedded American grain, and reflects America’s 
response to modernity and its dark face, of which Islamic radicalism appeared to be the new and latest 
expression: a response that is ‘extraordinarily optimistic and progressive on the one hand, yet afflicted 
by a sense of extraordinary, perhaps unmanageable crisis, on the other’ (Ninkovich, 1998: 10-12). 
For many Americans, post 9/11 2001 was not a time for cautious realism, because cautiousness is 
not appropriate in dramatic and emotional times. Nor it was a time for weak idealism or, even worse, 
irenic escapisms, because—many argued—when survival is at stake, hesitations must be overcome 
and scruples must be abandoned. It was, in the final analysis, a time when power and ideas, strength 
and principles, force and mission had to be reconciled; when circumstances imposed the United States 
to be both utopian and implacable: because an alternative to what the world had become (and to the 
intolerable situation in the Middle East) appeared indispensable, and the will and determination to 
pursue that goal to the end, with whatever means, were deemed necessary.  
                                                      
10  According to editor of the Weekly’s Standard, David Gelernter, a terrorist is ‘a totalitarian out of office’. Gelernter, 2004. 
Similarly, liberal commentator Paul Berman presented the war against terrorism as a struggle against a new 
totalitarianism. The war in Iraq was therefore needed to ‘discourage and defeat’ the ‘mass totalitarian movement of the 
Muslim world’. Defeating ‘totalitarianism’—Berman claimed—was (and is) a necessary step to promote the global cause 
of ‘liberalism’. Roundtable, Slate, 2004 and Berman, 2003. Mario Del Pero 
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The syncretic neoconservative message was there to satisfy such a request. This was also due to the 
fact that what was really asked (or what was more popular in post 9/11 America) was a ‘persuasion’, 
and not a policy. Americans asked for optimistic and sanguine responses, and not for fatalistic (as 
much as realistic) clichés, according to which terrorism could not be defeated and eradicated, but only 
contained and limited. And neoconservatism was indeed a very optimistic ‘persuasion’, more than a 
consistent political project (I. Kristol, 2003; Bai, 2004). 
This explains the return of that very combination of utopianism and realpolitik, of morality and 
power that qualified, ab origine, the neoconservative message. And this explains also the reaffirmation 
of the traditional conviction that it is only the global expansion of U.S. style democracy that can 
ultimately guarantee the security of America itself; that the United States, as asserted in a popular 
World War II slogan, cannot live in a world which is ‘half free and half slave’ (Foner, 1998: 219-247; 
Stephanson, 2000).  
Hence, the ‘balance of power that favors freedom’ of the 2002 NSS: a ‘confused’ and ‘even 
meaningless concept’, according to U.S. diplomatic historian Melvin Leffler (Leffler, 2003: 10). 
‘Meaningless’ because it tries to associate a realist quintessential model—a situation in which 
overwhelming power cannot last, because power balancing is the inevitable (and intrinsic) fate of the 
international system—with a typically messianic and idealistic goal—spreading a preponderant and 
universal freedom, that by itself cannot be balanced. The former envisions equilibrium, the latter 
aspires instead to hegemony.
11 Nevertheless, the ‘balance of power for freedom’ is a slogan capable of 
combining and uniting the two founding elements of neoconservatism, and of reconciling, at least 
rhetorically, their intrinsic duality. This also explains the success of the other slogans coined by 
neocons in these past three years: from calls to promote a ‘moral and muscular […] Real Democratik’ 
(Kuchpan, 2004) to Charles Krauthammer’s recent invitation to support a new and realistic 
‘democratic globalism’: ‘beyond power. Beyond interest […] expansive and utopian’ yet sharing 
‘realism’s insights about the centrality of power’ and ‘having appropriate contempt for the fictional 
legalisms of liberal internationalism’ (Krauthammer, 2004). 
The events of the past two years, and the war in Iraq in particular, have probably proved this duality 
incompatible. They have shown that even today a policy—sober, cautious, realistic and, possibly, 
relativistic—is still preferable to a persuasion. And they have shown, once more, that power –
unchallengeable, ‘unbalanceable’ and unprecedented as the one the U.S. can currently deploy– is 
unlikely, on its own, to generate and spread liberty and democracy. Finally, the intervention in Iraq also 
seems to have contributed to a paradoxical normalization of the ‘war on terror’. Undertaken to defeat 
international terrorism and change the Middle East, it has evolved into a further step in transforming the 
emergency and the crisis into normalcy and rule. The struggle against terrorism is ceasing to be a 
transient and transitory stage—a crisis indeed—to become the norm and the long-term perspective of 
the new international system. All in all, neoconservatism as a quintessentially ‘crisis internationalism’ 
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11  A different view from the one presented here can be found in Gaddis, 2004.  ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’. The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neo-Conservative Persuasion 
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